This case is worth knowing in detail. The facts are sobering: Graciela Quiroz went to a Jumpstreet trampoline park on November 29, 2014 with her teenage son. She signed a pre-injury release titled "Jumpstreet, LLC Release and Parent/Guardian Waiver of Liability and Assumption of Risk" — which warned in capital letters directly under the title that by signing, she was giving up legal rights. She jumped on a trampoline, attempted a flip, injured her neck, and is now paralyzed from the waist down. She sued Jumpstreet for negligence and gross negligence. Her husband joined for loss of consortium, and three minor children brought bystander and loss of parental consortium claims. Jumpstreet moved for summary judgment on the release. The trial court granted it. The Texas Court of Appeals, Fifth District at Dallas, affirmed — and its analysis is a detailed guide to what makes a Texas liability waiver hold up.
On the dissolved entity problem. The release named "Jumpstreet, LLC," which had been dissolved in June 2011 — three years before Quiroz's injury. Quiroz argued the release was void because you cannot form a contract with a nonexistent entity. The court rejected this. The release also extended to "its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates, other related entities, successors, owners, members, directors, officers, shareholders, agents, employees, servants, assigns, investors, legal representatives and all individuals and entities involved in the operation of Jumpstreet." That sweep was broad enough to cover the actual defendants — Jumpstreet8, Inc., Jumpstreet, Inc., and Jumpstreet Construction, Inc. — with sufficient particularity that their identity was never in doubt. The lesson: "affiliates and related entities" language can save a release even when the named entity is wrong. But operators should still keep the legal entity name in their waivers current and accurate.
On conspicuousness. Texas requires that waiver language be conspicuous — presented in a manner that a reasonable person ought to have notice. The Jumpstreet release had bolded headings and capitalized font throughout. The all-caps warning ("PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY. BY SIGNING IT, YOU ARE GIVING UP LEGAL RIGHTS.") appeared directly under the title on page one. An assumption of risk paragraph on page two was in all capital letters and enclosed in a box. The waiver and release language was repeated once more, in capitals, immediately above the signature line where Quiroz filled in her name, date of birth, age, address, and telephone number. The court found this more than sufficient.
On the express negligence rule. Texas also requires that a party's intent to release its own future negligence appear in clear, unambiguous terms within the four corners of the document. The release above Quiroz's signature expressly listed "negligence claims, gross negligence claims, personal injury claims, and mental anguish claims" as waived. This satisfied the rule. Both negligence and gross negligence were named, which proved decisive on the gross negligence question below.
On paralysis not being named. Quiroz argued the release was unenforceable as to her specific injury because paralysis was not enumerated as a covered harm. The court disagreed. The release listed possible injuries "including but not limited to" sprains, heart attack, and death. Paralysis, the court noted, is "certainly less than death" and therefore falls within the "but not limited to" language. Operators do not need to list every conceivable injury by name, provided the release uses inclusive language and contemplates catastrophic outcomes.
On gross negligence. Texas courts have been divided on whether a pre-injury release can validly waive gross negligence claims. The court here distinguished its earlier decision in Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop — where a release of negligence was held not to also release gross negligence — because Quiroz's release expressly named gross negligence as a waived claim type. When gross negligence is explicitly called out, it can be waived in Texas under this court's analysis.
On the children's claims. Quiroz sustained the injuries; her children did not. Their claims for loss of parental consortium and bystander mental anguish were derivative, rising and falling with the primary claim. Since Quiroz's own negligence and gross negligence claims were barred by the release, the children's derivative claims were barred along with them. Bystander claims, though technically independent, also failed because a bystander plaintiff cannot recover unless the injured person can recover.
Graciela Quiroz, et al v. Jumpstreet8, Inc., Jumpstreet, Inc. and Jumpstreet Construction, Inc. Appeal from 298th Judicial District Court of Dallas County. No. 05-17-00948-CV.