This Missouri appellate decision provides a significant victory for haunted attraction operators and a clear statement of assumption-of-risk doctrine applied to Halloween haunt events. Carly Munoz was injured at Six Flags Fright Fest after being startled by a scare actor—the encounter may or may not have involved the actor actively chasing her—and she sued for negligence. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Six Flags, holding her claim barred by the doctrine of implied primary assumption of the risk.
The court's reasoning was straightforward: when a patron voluntarily attends a haunted attraction expressly designed to frighten and scare guests, they necessarily assume the risk of being startled. The startle response is not a flaw in the operation; it is the entire purpose of the experience. Falling as a result of being startled is thus an inherent, obvious risk of the activity that patrons voluntarily accept when they pay for admission. Critically, the court found that Munoz had observed exactly this kind of scare-and-run behavior for three hours before her injury and continued participating anyway — a fact that powerfully reinforced the "knowing and voluntary" element of the doctrine.
The court also addressed the factual dispute over whether the clown was "chasing" Munoz or merely startling a nearby group. It ruled the distinction immaterial: even if an active chase had occurred, that conduct would still fall within the inherent nature of a Fright Fest scare experience and would not give rise to a duty on Six Flags' part. The scare — in whatever form it took — was what Munoz paid to experience.
This decision reinforces that assumption-of-risk doctrine provides meaningful protection to haunt operators when injuries arise from the very risks that define the haunted attraction experience. At the same time, the decision draws a clear boundary. The doctrine protects the inherent scare experience; it does not shield conduct that crosses into genuine recklessness or that goes outside the legitimate scope of a performer's role. Operators cannot simply claim every injury is inherent to the experience — they must ensure performers are properly trained and supervised so that their conduct stays within the reasonable bounds the doctrine protects. The key distinction is between a scare that frightens and a scare that harms through conduct no reasonable haunt would sanction.
Missouri Court of Appeals (Eastern Dist.)